Why do criminal politicians win elections? Scholars theorize that voters may forgive criminal allegations when politicians are more effective at delivering state resources. This paper examines this theory with data from India’s largest rural workforce program. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that in constituencies where a criminal politician won, the project completion rate falls by 68%, but work allocation increases by 36%. Program funds in criminal constituencies are disproportionately allocated to labour, rather than materials. These findings suggest that criminal politicians strategically target the wage dimension of the program as a mechanism to buy voter support.

This paper examines whether exposure to political corruption influences tax preferences and compliance. We conduct a conjoint experiment in the Indian state of Bangalore, where respondents are randomly exposed with vignettes of political candidates who differ in their corruption status, status, political affiliation, and public spending promises. Preliminary findings show that political corruption reduces willingness to disclose tax evasion. Respondents exposed to corruption treatment appear to have a lower tolerance for tax evasion, even under conditions where such behaviour might be seen as justifiable. We find no change in behaviour based on the public goods promised or political affiliation. These findings suggest that exposure to corruption undermines trust in government and fosters moral distancing from tax evasion.

Policies expanding police discretionary authority are widespread and politically contested, yet their effects on police behaviour, institutional trust, and political preferences remain poorly understood. We study Britain's 2014 Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, which authorised local councils to implement Public Space Protection Orders (PSPOs), prohibiting broadly defined anti-social activities and expanding officer discretion in designated areas. Using the first comprehensive dataset on PSPO implementation across London census tracts (2016–2024), linked to crime records, stop-and-search data, and electoral outcomes, we exploit PSPOs' staggered adoption to identify causal effects. These policies increase unproductive police stop-and-search activity, disproportionately targeting non-white residents. Reported anti-social behaviour and other crimes remain unaffected. These findings suggest that vaguely defined discretionary enforcement tools can generate racially unequal policing without delivering the public order benefits that justify their adoption.